In this paper, we study the problem of estimating the covariance matrix under differential privacy, where the underlying covariance matrix is assumed to be sparse and of high dimensions. We propose a new method, called DP-Thresholding, to achieve a nontrivial 2 -norm based error bound, which is significantly better than the existing ones from adding noise directly to the empirical covariance matrix. We also extend the 2norm based error bound to a general -norm based one for any 1 ≤ ≤ ∞, and show that they share the same upper bound asymptotically. Our approach can be easily extended to local differential privacy. Experiments on the synthetic datasets show consistent results with our theoretical claims.
Introduction
Machine Learning and Statistical Estimation have made profound impact in recent years to many applied domains such as social sciences, genomics, and medicine. During their applications, a frequently encountered challenge is how to deal with the high dimensionality of the datasets, especially for those in genomics, educational and psychological research. A commonly adopted strategy for dealing with such an issue is to assume that the underlying structures of parameters are sparse.
Another often encountered challenge is how to handle sensitive data, such as those in social science, biomedicine and genomics. A promising approach is to use some differentially private mechanisms for the statistical inference and learning tasks. Differential Privacy (DP) [1] is a widely-accepted criterion that provides provable protection against identification and is resilient to arbitrary auxiliary information that might be available to attackers. Since its introduction over a decade ago, a rich line of works are now available, which have made differential privacy a compelling privacy enhancing technology for many organizations, such as Uber [2] , Google [3] , Apple [4] .
Estimating or studying the high dimensional datasets while keeping them (locally) differentially private could be quite challenging for many problems, such as sparse linear regression [5] , sparse mean estimation [6] and selection problem [7] . However, there are also evidences showing that the loss of some problems under the privacy constraints can be quite small compared with their non-private counterparts. Examples of such nature include high dimensional sparse PCA [8] , sparse inverse covariance estimation [9] , and high-dimensional distributions estimation [10] . Thus, it is desirable to determine which high dimensional problem can be learned or estimated efficiently in a private manner.
In this paper, we try to give an answer to this question for a simple but fundamental problem in machine learning and statistics, called estimating the underlying sparse covariance matrix of bounded sub-Gaussian distribution. For this problem, we propose a simple but nontrivial ( , )-DP method, DP-Thresholding, and show that the squared -norm error for any 1 ≤ ≤ ∞ is bounded by ( log 2 ), where is the sparsity of each row in the underlying covariance matrix. Moreover, our method can be easily extended to the local differentialy privacy model. Experiments on synthetic datasets confirm the theoretical claims. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper studying the problem of estimating high dimensional sparse covariance matrix under (local) differential privacy.
Related Work
Recently, there are several papers studying private distribution estimation, such as [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] . For distribution estimation under the central differential privacy model, [12] considers the 1-dimensional private mean estimation of a Gaussian distribution with (un)known variance. The work that is probably most related to ours is [10] , which studies the problem of privately learning a multivariate Gaussian and product distributions. The following are the main differences with ours. Firstly, our goal is to estimate the covariance of a sub-Gaussian distribution. Even though the class of distributions considered in our paper is larger than the one in [10] , it has an additional assumption which requires the 2 norm of a sample of the distribution to be bounded by 1. This means that it does not include the general Gaussian distribution. Secondly, although [10] also considers the high dimensional case, it does not assume the sparsity of the underlying covariance matrix. Thus, its error bound depends on the dimensionality polynomially, which is large in the high dimensional case ( ≫ ), while the dependence in our paper is only logarithmically (i.e., log ). Thirdly, the error in [10] is measured by the total variation distance, while it is by -norm in our paper. Thus, the two results are not comparable. Fourthly, the methods in [10] seem difficult to be extended to the local model. [14] recently also studies the covariance matrix estimation via iterative eigenvector sampling. However, their method is just for the low dimensional case and with Frobenious norm as the error measure.
Distribution estimation under local differential privacy has been studied in [13, 11] .
However, both of them study only the 1-dimensional Gaussian distribution. Thus, it is quite different from the class of distributions in our paper.
In this paper, we mainly use Gaussian mechanism to the covariance matrix, which has been studied in [15, 8, 9] . However, as it will be shown later, simply outputting the perturbed covariance can cause big error and thus is insufficient for our problem. Compared to these problems, ours is clearly more complicated.
Preliminaries

Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [1] is by now a defacto standard for statistical data privacy which constitutes a strong standard for privacy guarantees for algorithms on aggregate databases. One likely reason that it gains so much popularity is its guarantee of no significant change on the outcome distribution when there is one entry change to the dataset. We say that two datasets , ′ are neighbors if they differ by only one entry, denoted as ∼ ′ .
Definition 1 (Differentially Private [1] ). A randomized algorithm  is ( , )-differentially private (DP) if for all neighboring datasets , ′ and for all events in the output space of , the following holds
We will use Gaussian Mechanism [1] to guarantee ( , )-DP. Definition 2 (Gaussian Mechanism). Given any function ∶  → ℝ , the Gaussian Mechanism is defined as:
Here Δ 2 ( ) is the 2 -sensitivity of the function , i.e.
Gaussian Mechanism preservers ( , )-differential privacy.
Private Sparse Covariance Estimation
Let 1 , 2 , ⋯ , be random samples from a -variate distribution with covariance matrix Σ = ( ) 1≤ , ≤ , where the dimensionality is assumed to be high, i.e., ≫ ≥ Poly(log ).
We define the parameter space of -sparse covariance matrices as the following:
where − , means the -th column of Σ with the entry removed. That is, a matrix in  0 ( ) has at most non-zero off-diagonal elements in each column.
We assume that each is sampled from a 0-mean and sub-Gaussian distribution with parameter 2 , that is,
This means that all the one-dimensional marginals of have sub-Gaussian tails. We also assume that with probability 1, ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1. We note that such assumptions are quite common in the differential privacy literature, such as [8] .
Let  ( 2 , ) denote the set of distributions of satisfying all the above conditions (ı.e., (2) and ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ 1) and with the covariance matrix Σ ∈  0 ( ). The goal of private covariance estimation is to obtain an estimator Σ priv of the underlying covariance matrix Σ based on { 1 , ⋯ , } ∼ ∈  ( 2 , ) while keeping it differnetially private. In this paper, we will focus on the ( , )-differential privacy. We use the 2 norm to measure the difference between Σ priv and Σ, i.e., ‖Σ priv − Σ‖ 2 .
is the empirical covariance matrix, then there exist constants 1 
for all | | ≤ , where 1 and are constants and depend only on 2 . Specifically,
Method
A First Approach
A direct way to obtain a private estimator is to perturb the empirical covariance matrix by symmetric Gaussian matrices, which has been used in previous work on private PCA, such as [15, 8] . However, as we can see bellow, this method will introduce big error.
By [15] , for any give 0 < , ≤ 1 and { 1 , 2 , ⋯ , } ∼ ∈  ( 2 , ), the following perturbing procedure is ( , )-differentially private:
where is a symmetric matrix with its upper triangle ( including the diagonal) being i.i.d samples from  (0, 2 1 ); here 2 1 = 2 ln(1.25∕ ) 2 2 , and each lower triangle entry is copied from its upper triangle counterpart. By [17] , we know that ‖ ‖ 2 ≤ (
). We can easily get that
where the second inequality is due to [18] . However, we can see that the upper bound of the error in (8) is quite large in the high dimensional case. Another issue of the private estimator in (7) is that it is not clear whether it is positive-semidefinite, a property that is normally expected from an estimator.
Post-processing via Thresholding
We note that one of the reasons that the private estimatorΣ in (7) fails is due to the fact that some entries are quite large which make ‖Σ − Σ ‖ 2 large for some , . To see it more precisely, by (4) and (5) we can get the following, with probability at least 1 − −6 , for all 1 ≤ , ≤ ,
Thus, to reduce the error, it is natural to think of the following way. For those with larger values, we keep the corresponding̃ in order to make their difference less than some threshold. For those with smaller values compared with (9), since the corresponding̃ may still be large, if we threshold̃ to 0, we can lower the error oñ − . Following the above thinking and the thresholding methods in [16] and [19] , we propose the following DP-Thresholding method, which post-processes the perturbed covariance matrix in (7) with the threshold
After thresholding, we further threshold the eigenvalues ofΣ in order to make it positive semi-definite. See Algorithm 1 for detail.
Proof. By [8] and [15] , we know that Step 1 keeps the matrix ( , )-differentially private. Thus, Algorithm 1 is ( , )-differentially private due to the post-processing property of differential privacy [1] .
Algorithm 1 DP-Thresholding : , are privacy parameters and
where is a symmetric matrix with its upper triangle (including the diagonal) being i.i.d samples from  (0, 2 1 ); here 2 1 = 2 ln(1.25∕ ) 2 2 , and each lower triangle entry is copied from its upper triangle counterpart. 2: Define the thresholding estimatorΣ = (̂ ) 1≤ , ≤ aŝ For the matrixΣ in (10) after the first step of thresholding, we have the following key lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Σ * = ( * ) 1≤ , ≤ and = ( ) 1≤ , ≤ . Define the event =
We have:
By the triangle inequality, it is easy to see that
Depending on the value of , we have the following three cases.
This is due to the followings:
where event denotes = {| * − | > 3 4 √ log + 2 √ 2 ln 1.25∕ log ) − | |}, and the last inequality is due to (4) and (5) .
Thus by (12) , with probability at least 1 − 1 − 9 2 − 2 − 9 2 , we have
which satisfies (11) .
. For this case, we have
where the proof is the same as (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) . Thus, with probability at least 1− 1
Also, by (9), (11) also holds.
For this case, we have
When | | ≤ √ log + 4 √ 2 ln 1.25∕ √ log , we can see from (9) that with probability at
Thus, (11) also holds. 
where the expectation is taken over the coins of the Algorithm and the randomness of
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show that ‖Σ + − Σ‖ 2 ≤ 2‖Σ − Σ‖ 2 . This is due to the following
where the third inequality is due to the fact that Σ is positive semi-definite. This means that we only need to bound ‖Σ − Σ‖ 2 . SinceΣ − Σ is symmetric, we know that ‖Σ − Σ‖ 2 ≤ ‖Σ − Σ‖ 1 [20] . Thus, it suffices to prove that the bound in (22) holds for ‖Σ − Σ‖ 1 .
We define event as
Then, by Lemma 3, we have ℙ( ) ≥ 1 − 2 1 − 9 2 . Let = ( ) 1≤ , ≤ , where = (̂ − ) ⋅ ( ). Then, we have
We first bound the first term of (24) . By the definition of and Lemma 3, we can upper bounded it by
where the second inequality is due to the assumption that at most elements of ( ) ≠ are non-zero. For the second term in (24), we have
For the first term in (26), we have
where the first inequality is due to Hölder inequality and the second inequality is due to the fact that (̃ − ) 8 8 , since is sampled from a sub-Gaussian distribution (2), by Whittle Inequality (Theorem 2 in [22] or [16] ), the quadratic form * satisfies ( * − ) 8 ≤ 5 1 for some positive constant 5 > 0.
For the second term of (26), we have
For the second term of (29), by Lemmas 1 and 2 we have 
For the first term of (29), by Lemma 2 we have
Thus in total, we have ‖ ‖ 2 1 = ( log 1∕ 2 ). This means that ‖Σ−Σ‖ 2 1 = ( log log 1∕ 2 ), which completes the proof. Corollary 1. For any 1 ≤ ≤ ∞, the matrixΣ in (10) after the first step of thresholding satisfies
where the -norm of any matrix is defined as ‖ ‖ = sup ‖ ‖ ‖ ‖ . Specifically, for a matrix = ( ) 1≤ , ≤ , ‖ ‖ 1 = sup ∑ | | is the maximum absolute column sum, and ‖ ‖ ∞ = sup ∑ | | is the maximum absolute row sum.
Comparing the bound in the above corollary with the optimal minimax rate Θ( log ) in [16] for the non-private case, we can see that the impact of the differential privacy is to make the number of efficient sample from to 2 . It is an open problem to determine whether the bound in Theorem 2 is tight.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Riesz-Thorin interpolation theorem [23] , we have
for any matrix and any 1 ≤ ≤ ∞. Since Σ + − Σ is a symmetric matrix, we have ‖Σ + − Σ‖ 2 ≤ ‖Σ + − Σ‖ 1 and ‖Σ + − Σ‖ 1 = ‖Σ + − Σ‖ ∞ . Thus, by the proof of Theorem 2 we get this corollary.
Extension to Local Differential Privacy
One advantage of our Algorithm 1 is that it can be easily extended to the locally differentially private (LDP) model.
Differential privacy in the local model.. In LDP, we have a data universe , players with each holding a private data record ∈ , and a server that is in charge of coordinating the protocol. An LDP protocol proceeds in rounds. In each round, the server sends a message, which sometime is called a query, to a subset of the players, requesting them to run a particular algorithm. Based on the queries, each player in the subset selects an algorithm , run it on her data, and sends the output back to the server. Inspired by Algorithm 1, it is easy to extend our DP algorithm to the LDP model. The idea is that each perturbs its covariance and aggregates the noisy version of covariance, see Algorithm 2 for detail.
The following theorem shows that the error bound of the output in Algorithm 2 is the same as the the bound in Theorem 2 asymptotically, whose proof is almost the same as in Theorem 2. 
).
Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1 and 2 practically on synthetic datasets.
Algorithm 2 LDP-Thresholding
: , are privacy parameters,
1: for Each ∈ [ ] do 2: Denotẽ ̃ = + , where ∈ ℝ × is a symmetric matrix with its upper triangle ( including the diagonal) being i.i.d samples from  (0, 2 ); here 2 = 2 ln(1.25∕ ) 2 , and each lower triangle entry is copied from its upper triangle counterpart. 3 : end for 4 Data Generation. We first generate a symmetric sparse matrix̃ with the sparsity ratio , that is, there are × × non-zero entries of the matrix. Then, we let =̃ + for some constant to make positive semi-definite and then scale it to = by some constant which makes the norm of samples less than 1 (with high probability) 1 . Finally, we sample { 1 , ⋯ , } from the multivariate Gaussian distribution  (0, ). In this paper, we will use set = 50 and = 200.
Experimental Settings. To measure the performance, we compare the 1 and 2 norm of relative error, respectively. That is,
with the sample size in three different settings: 1) we set = 100, = 1, = 1 and change the sparse ratio Experimental Results. Figure 1 and 2 are the results of DP-Thresholding (Algorithm 1) with 2 and 1 relative error, respectively. Figure 3 and 4 are the results of LDP-Thresholding (Algorithm 2) with 2 and 1 relative error, respectively. From the figures we can see that: 1) if the sparsity ratio is large i.e., the underlying covairance matrix is Figure 1 : Experiment results of Algorithm 1 for 2 -norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsity levels, the middle one is for different dimensionality , and the right one is for different privacy level . Figure 2 : Experiment results of Algorithm 1 for 1 -norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsity levels, the middle one is for different dimensionality , and the right one is for different privacy level . more dense, the relative error will be larger, this is due to the fact showed in Theorem 2 and 3 that the error depends on the sparsity . 2) The dimensionality only slightly affects the relative error. That is, even if we double the value of , the error increases only slightly. This is consistent with our theoretical analysis in Theorem 2 and 3 which says that the error of our private estimators is only logarithmically depending on (i.e., log ). 3) With the privacy parameter increases (which means more private), the error will become larger. This has also been showed in previous theorems.
In summary, all the experimental results support our theoretical analysis.
Conclusion and Discussion
In the paper, we study the problem of estimating the sparse covariance matrix of a bounded sub-Gaussian distribution under differential privacy model and propose a method called DP-Threshold, which achieves a non-trivial error bound and can be easily extended to the local model. Experiments on synthetic datasets yield consistent results with the theoretical analysis.
There are still some open problems for this problem. Firstly, although the thresholding method can achieve non-trivial error bound for our private estimator, in practice Figure 3 : Experiment results of Algorithm 2 for 2 -norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsity levels, the middle one is for different dimensionality , and the right one is for different privacy level . Figure 4 : Experiment results of Algorithm 2 for 1 -norm relative error. The left one is for different sparsity levels, the middle one is for different dimensionality , and the right one is for different privacy level .
it is hart to find the best threshold. Thus, an open problem is how to get the best threshold. Secondly, as mentioned in the related work section, there are many recent results on private Gaussian estimation, which may make the 2 norm of the samples greater than 1. Thus, it is an interesting problem to extend our method to a general Gaussian distribution.
